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Abstract
 
Water demand management, or making better use of the water we have — as opposed to augmenting supply — is
increasingly proposed as a way of mitigating water-scarcity problems. Moving water away from agriculture to uses with
higher economic value is one of the main measures widely seen as desirable. Sectoral “allocation stress” is seen as
resulting from the disproportionate share, and inefficient use of water in the agricultural sector. This apparent misallocation
is often attributed to the failure of government to allocate water rationally.
This paper revisits this commonly-accepted wisdom and examines the nature of urban water scarcity, showing the
importance of economic and political factors, shaped by incentives to decision-makers, and sometimes compounded by
climatic conditions. It shows that cities’ growth is not generally constrained by competition with agriculture. In general,
rather than using a narrow financial criterion, cities select options that go along the “path of least resistance,” whereby
economic, social and political costs are considered in conjunction. The question of allocation stress is thus reframed into
an inquiry of how transfers effectively occur and can be made more effective.
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1. Introduction
 
Human use of water is reportedly increasing with population
growth and economic activity (Molden 
 
et al.
 
, 2007). As
irrigation diversions rise, they tend to displace water’s
natural functions and impact on ecosystem health. And as
cities and economies expand, domestic, industrial, and in-
stream uses also start to impinge on the quantity, quality
and timing of water flows, not only for the environment but
also for existing and potential agricultural uses. Conflicts
amongst and between environmental and human uses
intensify, and mechanisms emerge — some planned, many
unplanned — to rebalance sectoral allocations. In many
river basins, water resource development has by now
reached — or exceeded — its limits; marginal additional
sources provide only very costly alternatives; and new
projects reallocate water already appropriated for human or
crucial environmental use (Molle 
 
et al.
 
, 2007a).
Handling these conflicts and the sectoral re-balancing
that is implied are a major concern of recent literature on
water management. Many believe that better use can be made
of the resources at our disposal (Gleick, 2003; Molden,
2007), that water is too often devoted to economically
inefficient, low return (usually agricultural) uses and that
reallocation to more efficient, high return (usually urban)
uses would increase total economic welfare. Others consider
that human uses have been satisfied at unacceptable costs
to the environment and that this must be redressed.
Associated with issues of value are questions related to the
mechanisms of effecting transfers to optimize value (however
value is determined). What mix of political, administrative
and market mechanisms is to be preferred and under what
conditions? And how far and in what ways should the
resultant mix be regulated to ensure that transfers are
achieved in an efficient and effective manner?
Optimization of sectoral allocations is seen by many
observers as one pillar of water demand management,
defined as a “policy that stresses making better use of existing
supplies, rather than developing new ones” (Winpenny,
1997). Demand management employs a variety of
measures including price incentives, market mechanisms,
quotas, subsidies, conservation, treatment, re-cycling,
awareness-raising and education (Frederick, 1993; Hamdy
 
et al.
 
, 1995; Winpenny, 1997; Brooks, 1997). For Gleick
(2003) such efforts together with decentralization and user
participation define a “soft path” approach. Pricing and
markets to balance supply and demand have received
particular attention (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Bhatia
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et al.,
 
 1994; Tsur and Dinar, 1995; Thobani, 1997; Dinar and
Subramanian, 1997; Easter 
 
et al.
 
, 1998; Johansson, 2000).
Making better economic use of water implies emphasis
on its productivity and the economic welfare that can be
derived from alternate uses. Misallocation is held to be a
manifestation of poor water management and to result in
economic inefficiency. Dinar (1998), for example, holds
that: “the potential for economic benefits from allocation-
oriented institutional change are not only substantial but
also increasing with each increase in water scarcity.” Rosegrant
and Cline (2002) posit that “there is considerable scope for
water savings and economic gains through water reallocation
to higher-value uses”, while Merrett (2003) states that “in
the field of water resources management a widely held
 
belief
 
 exists that allocation stress is to be found in many
parts of the world” (emphasis added). The World Bank’s
(1993) policy paper remarks that the value of water differs
greatly between agriculture and other sectors “often
indicating gross misallocations if judged by economic
criteria” but goes one step further in pointing towards a
possible remedy: “Setting prices at the right level is not
enough; prices need to be paid if they are to enhance the
efficient allocation of resources.” Price and market
mechanisms are thus not only presented as a means of cost
recovery and demand regulation but also as a way of
reallocating water towards higher-value uses.
The apparent strength of these arguments is predicated
on four interconnected assertions:
1. That agriculture gets the 
 
“lion’s share”
 
 of all diverted
water resources (70% at world level: much more (80–
95%) in developing countries);
2. That agricultural use incurs large wastage, typified by
ubiquitous statements to the effect that two-thirds of
water delivered to agriculture fails to reach the crop or
that irrigation efficiency is typically 30–40%;
3. That the value of water in non-agricultural sectors is
much higher than in agriculture, typically by an order
of magnitude; and
4. That cities are frequently water short, as shown by cities
that ration supplies or fail to guarantee water pressure,
either permanently or during dry spells, and by urban areas
with precarious or non-existent water supply facilities.
The narrative based on these four statements suggests that
water is misallocated, with two implicit corollaries. First,
responsibility for this is attributed to the State, since it is
generally assumed that the State allocates water through
centralized management. This assumed failure prompts
proposals for pricing and market mechanisms as an alternative
(Holden and Thobani, 1996; Anderson and Snyder, 1997;
Dinar, 1998; Rosegrant and Cline, 2002). Second, the
contrasting share of water used in agriculture with that in
other uses suggests that a relatively limited level of water
saving in agriculture would easily make up for the additional
needs of the urban sector. This is well exemplified by Gleick
(2001) who states that: “The largest single consumer of water
is agriculture — and this use is largely inefficient ... as much
as half of all water diverted for agriculture never yields any
food. Thus, even modest improvements in agricultural
efficiency could free up huge quantities of water.”
 
1
 
In other words, irrigation profligacy and bureaucratic
ineffectiveness help explain urban shortage.
 
2
 
 Consequently,
solutions lie, in part, in demand management in the urban
sector but more fundamentally in the improvement of efficiency
in agricultural use. Substantial quantities of water can be
freed and used in higher value uses, reducing the allocation
stress for the common good. Water markets may be instrumental
in such reallocation and avoid government failure.
This narrative presents us with a riddle: if large economic
benefits are waiting to be realized by shifting water out of
agriculture through marginal improvements in irrigation
efficiency why do reallocation and related improvements
seem so problematic? Why have governments failed to
recognize these benefits, especially in contexts where urban
bias is pervasive? While not necessarily discarding all the
foregoing arguments, we review here the validity of the
implicit causal links inherent in the conventional knowledge
outlined above. We first briefly look at the validity of the
four abovementioned statements, then question the nature
of urban water scarcity, and finally analyse empirical
evidence on intersectoral transfers. This will take us to the
final section where we attempt to revisit the “allocation
gap” and its conventional explicative framework. The paper
is anchored in a comprehensive review of urban–rural water
conflicts worldwide, to which the reader is referred for
more detail (Molle and Berkoff, 2006).
 
2. Agricultural water use and productivity
 
2.1. Most water is used by irrigation
 
To stress that agriculture gets the lion’s share implicitly
establishes a causal relationship between its large share and
the allegedly unfulfilled needs of non-agriculture sectors.
But irrigated agriculture is a biophysical process that
inherently needs a lot of water. In most cases, if practiced,
irrigation requires much more water than other consumptive
 
1
 
These points are repeated in countless publications. Winpenny (1997)
states that: “The fact that agriculture is such a dominant and, by many
accounts, a profligate user of water has led many people to believe that
relatively small savings in its water use would be easy to achieve.” See
similar statements in IRN (2003), Simon (1998), Schiffler (1998), and
Postel (2001), among others.
 
2
 
An example of the putative causal link between agricultural wastage
and urban water scarcity is given by the World Water Commission (WWC)
(2000): “In many public irrigation systems only 30% of water supplied is
actually used by plants. This is unacceptable when half of the people of
the developing world live on less than $2 a day — and when more than
1 billion people have no access to clean water and 2 billion lack adequate
sanitation.” See a similar statement in ADB (2000).
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uses.
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 Moreover, agriculture’s share is typically dominant
when the needs of other activities — apart from those of
the environment — have yet to demand comparable amounts.
This has been aggravated by the fact that states have
invested massively in subsidized irrigation development for
a host of (sometimes controversial) socioeconomic and
political reasons, reasons which tend to be forgotten with
time.
 
4
 
 Where other human uses do in fact compete for
significant amounts, the balance shifts and irrigation almost
always becomes the 
 
residual 
 
human use after other needs
have been met. To stay with animal metaphors, the lion’s
share is perhaps better described as the hyena’s share. In
many cases, however, agriculture compensates for this loss
by reusing wastewater (as in Israel and Jordan) and/or by
displacing nature. Nature thus can be considered the
 
ultimate residual “user”
 
; this is discussed later.
Furthermore, irrigation often utilizes flood flows and
other marginal sources that cannot provide the level of
dependability required by domestic and industrial users.
Irrigation thus typically uses a lot of water 
 
at times when
 
it has no alternative use. In other cases, irrigation and urban
networks are disconnected hydraulically and either transfers
are impracticable or the costs of storage and/or integration
are prohibitively expensive.
 
2.2. Farmers waste water
 
Irrigation’s dominant share appears consistent with the
conventional belief that farmers waste water: therefore, are
not large consumers squanderers? The alleged wastage in
irrigation has been the subject of a large body of literature,
and decision makers and the media worldwide continue to
refer to classical irrigation inefficiency in order to stress
alleged mismanagement or to justify interventions of one
sort or another. Without entering into the details of this question,
it is important to emphasize that waste is often relative: if
water has no other economic use and is not scarce then
 
‘wastage’ 
 
is of little concern other than for any impacts it
has on the environment. During the rainy season or in
surplus river basins, low irrigation efficiency is thus
typically irrelevant.
Even in water short basins, a loss at one point typically
flows back to the river or an aquifer and — subject to water
quality — can often be recycled downstream. If so,
efficiency at basin-level is much higher than within any
individual use level. Wasteful practices that result in true
losses to the system occur but are not the general rule
(Burt, 1995; Keller 
 
et al.
 
, 1996; Perry, 1999; Molden and
Sakthivadivel, 1999; Molle 
 
et al.
 
, 2004).
In situations of scarcity, tales of irrigation waste are both
misleading and unfair to farmers. First, farmers seldom
have a say in the amount of water allocated (or not) to
them. And, second, irrigation managers and farmers
respond to physical scarcity by optimizing water’s value
to them — adjusting crops, practices and calendars, and
developing conjunctive use by digging ponds or wells and
installing pumps (Molle, 2004b; Loeve 
 
et al.
 
, 2003).
Except in fully controlled on-demand systems — the rare
exception rather than the rule — the stochastic and varying
nature of water supply means that the 
 
“hidden hand of
scarcity”
 
 provides both real time and longer term incentives
for efficient water use; and prompts (costly) adjustments
that are often overlooked (Berkoff, 2003).
 
2.3. Low water productivity in agriculture
 
That urban water uses usually have higher value to society
than irrigation uses is predicated on the assumption that
their water productivity, i.e., the ratio of total monetary
output to the amount of water used, is higher. But this can
be presented in ambiguous terms, either because water
does not really constitute a production factor or because
like is not being compared with like. According to Gleick
(2001), for instance, “supporting 100,000 high-tech California
jobs requires some 250 million gallons of water a year;
the same amount of water used in the agriculture sector
sustains fewer than 10 jobs — a stunning difference”. He
sees a shift from the latter to the former as providing
“tremendous gains in efficiency” as if they were really in
competition. There is no indication that high-tech industry
is ever short of water and it is equivocal to suggest it
competes with agriculture (UNDP, 2006). Only in a few
cases is water a significant industrial cost and it is thus often
misleading to express total added value in terms of returns
to a single factor.
 
3. The nature of urban water scarcity
 
Urban water scarcity is often associated with percentages
of population not having access to tap water, occurrence of
water-borne diseases, or other accounts of poor Water
Supply & Sanitation (WS&S) conditions. It is sometimes
also linked to alleged constraints on urban expansion or
industrial development. This section investigates the nature
of domestic urban scarcity and whether economic develop-
ment is constrained by water being locked up in low-value
agricultural uses.
 
3.1. Physical and economic water scarcity
 
Records of many “thirsty cities”, affected by droughts, suggest
physical water scarcity. Cities in arid settings understandably
 
3
 
Whether in rainfed or irrigated agriculture, water needs for basic food
requirement are in the order of ten times larger than our basic need for
domestic water, and in the order of 500 times larger than our need for
water to drink (Abernethy, 2005).
 
4
 
Irrigation has been widely promoted as a tool to deal with food
insecurity, rural poverty, unemployment and regional development. Along
with its rent-seeking and pork-barrel dimensions, this has frequently
resulted in the overbuilding of irrigation systems and the (over)commitment
of much of the available water resources (Molle, 2008).
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run out of water in their immediate vicinity and must
usually opt for costly and distant transfers. Indeed, many
cities have developed in the 
 
“wrong”
 
 place and are chronically
water short (Winpenny, 1994). Chennai, Mexico City, Las
Vegas and Amman are cities that have mushroomed despite
limited nearby water resources. Ta’iz grew between 1986–
94 at a rate of 7.9%, despite being one of the most water-
stressed cities in the world. Even in water-abundant areas,
cities outstrip proximate resources when located in upper
catchments (e.g., São Paulo, Atlanta, Kuala Lumpur) or in
small coastal catchments (e.g., Manila, New York, Boston).
Numerous cities provide water only one or two days per
week, conveying a sense of sheer deprivation. Yet, Amman,
for example, with its one-day-a-week delivery, still consumes
135 l/c/day (i.e., roughly the European average) (Darmame,
2004). Intermittent supply is at least in part due to a
concern for limiting the leakage that would result from
constant pressure and is typically dealt with by storage at
the household level (Decker, 2004; Briscoe, 1999). Low
figures tend to be associated with less-than-ideal water
conditions but it is often difficult to distinguish between
core needs, comfort, superfluity, excess, and waste. Malé,
capital of the Maldives, relies on desalinated water.
Consumption is no more than 34 l/c/day though supply is
24-hour and reliable (McIntosh, 2003) and is less problematic,
for instance, than Chennai with its 68 l/c/day (Brisset, 2003).
The loose causal link between physical water availability
and actual supply is shown by the fact that water-short cities
have often been faced with insufficient supply throughout
their history, regardless of size.
 
5
 
 Likewise, there is no
shortage of large cities in water-abundant regions with deficient
water supply and sanitation systems: e.g., Lagos (Olukoya,
2004) and Calcutta, with their contaminated sources,
dilapidated networks and limited treatment and distribution.
Bangladesh is another country with abundant water, yet a
total of 2.5 million people in the slums of Dhaka are said
to suffer from very precarious provision of water and
sanitation (UNESCO, 2003). Ho Chi Minh City has quite
abundant sources of water, but only 44% of the people have
piped water connections to their homes and service is
intermittent in 25% of the service area (McIntosh, 2003).
This suggests that the core problem is economic rather
than physical scarcity, even if the latter may compound the
former. Precarious or underdeveloped infrastructure reflects
both inadequate funds and a lack of political will. As
stressed by Camdessus (2003) “The root cause [of poor
water supply to population] is our negligence and our
resignation in the face of inequality . . . All governments,
agreeing on the importance of water, subscribe to
internationally inspired commitments and undertakings. But
their spending performance is at odds with their rhetoric:
in most countries the water sector is given a disproportionately
small share in the budget.” The capital needed for
infrastructural development varies widely but the central
question is — unambiguously — who is to pay? Not, where
are we going to find the water?
 
6
 
3.2. Urban scarcity in times of drought
 
Instances of drought leading to shortage and conflict are
often said to epitomise allocation problems. They also
suggest that allocation conflicts are not usually a problem
of average but of extreme events, when scarcity has to be
shared among users. Are crises due to unrestrained use in
agriculture and failure to spare cities by reallocating
irrigation water?
In practice, there is overwhelming evidence that the
domestic and non-agricultural sectors get priority in times
of shortage. In 2005, for example, shortages in industry
and tourism in the “Eastern Seaboard” near Bangkok have
been quickly diffused by the implementation of six inter-
basin transfers and the drilling of 290 artesian wells for
short-term relief (Samabuddhi, 2005). Page (2001) cites a
survey of Hebei province that showed “how local officials
enforced restrictions on farmers but overlooked those on
industry to lure projects from which they could profit”. The
California State Water Project cut off farmers in 1991, and
the Bureau of Reclamation reduced supplies in the Central
Valley by 75% (Anderson and Snyder, 1997). When Indonesia
was hit with a major drought in 1994, residents’ wells ran
dry but supply to Jakarta’s golf courses was ensured so as
not to impact on tourism. In 1998, in the midst of a 3-year
drought, the Government of Cyprus cut the water supply
to farmers by 50% while guaranteeing the country’s annual
two million tourists the water they needed (Barlow and
Clarke, 2003). Other examples where agriculture suffered
first include droughts in Amman, Chennai (Ramakrishnan,
2002), the Guadaquiver basin in Spain (Fereres and Cena,
1997), the Alentejo region in Portugal (Caldas
 
 et al.
 
, 1997),
Bangkok (Molle, 2004b), and Manila (McIntosh, 2003).
It is important to note, however, that per capita water
supply is usually socially segregated both in normal times
and in times of shortage. Amman East, for example, the
poorer area of the capital uses 75 l/c/day, about half of the
consumption in affluent areas (Darmame, 2004). In
Ahmedabad, India, 25% of the population consumed 90%
of the water while 75% consumed 10%. In Calcutta, slum
areas received 80 l/day, while non-slum areas were supplied
240 l/day (UNDP, 1998). Phoenix in arid Arizona, with
average consumption of more than 1,000 l/c/day, has wealthy
satellite towns like Paradise Valley where consumption is
over 1,600 l/c/day. In other words, urban elites are largely
 
5
 
See for example Darmame (2004) for Amman, Swyngedouw (2003) for
Guayaquil, and Ducrot 
 
et al.
 
 (2003) for São Paulo.
 
6
 
Likewise, the World Water Assessment Program (WWAP: UNESCO,
2003) report and Anton’s (1995) review of water supply in Latin American
and Caribbean cities do not refer to physical water scarcity as a problem,
let alone an agriculture-based one, and emphasize the financial implications
of supplying cities.
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insulated from water shortage and also have the means to
buy tanker water in extreme conditions.
Except for situations where irrigation holds ‘senior’
water rights and regulation is effective (Colby, 1993)
 
7
 
 or
where allocation to agriculture is not reduced in time (crops
have already been planted), agriculture clearly stands at the
losing end and has to relinquish its share first; shortages
only affect domestic use secondarily (and partially), while
industries are usually affected last (but many rely on
groundwater). Evidence shows that instances of short-term
urban scarcity are thus due to a varying combination of
extreme climatic events, lax management of inter-annual
security stocks, and insufficient preparedness, rather than
to agriculture’s lion’s share (unless rigid water rights dictate
otherwise) (Molle 
 
et al.
 
, 2007b; Del Moral Ituarte and
Giansante, 2000).
 
3.3. Industries and urban economic activities
 
Discussions of urban scarcity generally focus on domestic
WS&S services, with little reference to stress undergone
by industries. Combining municipal and industrial (M&I)
uses because they are often spatially concentrated can be
confusing. They are distinct from both a physical and a
political-economic point of view. 
 
First
 
, industries generally
require a secure and continuous supply of high-quality
water. They thus tend to exploit deep aquifers where
feasible. In Bangkok, for example, 90% of industries resort
to groundwater (TDRI, 1990) mostly because the quality
of water from the river is too poor. 
 
Second
 
, the industrial
sector represents an interest group that is affluent, powerful
and closely linked to the highest levels of political and
bureaucratic apparatus.
Whether longer-term investments in services and industry
are constrained by water remains a matter for debate. This
is true at a certain level, since very high water-consuming
industries, such as aluminum, are unlikely to settle in water-
short areas. Chan and Shimou (1999) refer to industries
in coastal China that are occasionally affected by water
shortages, with suggestions that water-intensive industries
should be moved inland, but the option to increase supply
through the South–North transfer seems to have prevailed.
Even so, there is little evidence that cities and industries
are seriously constrained in their growth by water. By and
large, industries that offer to create jobs and increase
business taxes are unlikely to be denied preferential access
to municipal water. Alternatively, they abstract groundwater
regardless of whether this is sustainable or not. Ramakrishnan
(2002), for example, describes the drastic restrictions on
water supply in Chennai in the late 1990s drought but, at
the same time, reports that the Chennai Petroleum Corporation’s
demand for an additional 15,000 m
 
3
 
/day needed for its
expansion project (in addition to the existing supply of
18,000 m
 
3
 
) had been readily agreed to.
Simon (1998) notes that: “Ironically, the areas of the
world with the fastest growing populations are also the
areas with already severe water problems, and the shortage
will get much worse.” This serves to show that lack of
water does not hinder expansion although growth outpaces
financial capacity to expand supply networks. Such situations
often prevail when rural–urban transfers are characterized
as a push process, whereby impoverished rural families
migrate to cities out of despair, regardless of the conditions
they are likely to face in the cities. This contrasts starkly
with the situation in some western countries where water
is a prerequisite to expansion: many cities in the Western
US, for example, require developers to prove their access
to adequate provision of water before construction begins
(Emel, 1990; Lund and Israel, 1993).
 
3.4. The political economy of urban water supply
 
Given the prominence of the financial and political dimensions
of urban water scarcity, the central question becomes: how
do such investments become a priority? Several documents
(Rijsberman, 2004; UNESCO, 2003; Hecht, 2004) give
varying estimates of the financial resources needed to meet
MDG targets or to bring urban WS&S services up to
standard. These amounts are substantial but not beyond the
financial capacity of consumers, countries and international
institutions. Incentives to decision makers, the political
clout of a given city, and public mobilization all matter in
defining priorities.
In European history, in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, extension of WS&S facilities beyond the affluent
can be attributed to a combination of the hygienist movement,
a perceived “threat from below” (Chaplin, 1999) and/or the
need “to preserve order, cleanliness and a healthy workforce”
(Goubert, 1986). As early as the mid-18th century it was
recognized that “prevention of further environmental
degradation was cheaper and more effective ... than continuing
with expenditure on poor relief ” (Chaplin, 1999). Similarly,
in more recent times, elites in Guayaquil (Swyngedouw,
2003) and Monterrey (Bennett, 1995) reacted in response
to social unrest. In contrast, Chaplin (1999) attributes the
negative picture in India to a failure by both the lower and
middle classes to pressure government to invest.
The capacity of city managers and politicians to fund
investment is also closely linked to a city’s location within
the state/region/nation, both in geographical and in political
terms. Capital cities are more likely to get access to public
funds than other cities (e.g., Mexico: Connolly, 1999). How
taxes are distributed amongst administrative layers — central
to local government — is also crucial (e.g., Coimbatore:
Saravanan and Appasamy, 2001). Swyngedouw’s study
(2003) on Guayaquil and Bennett’s (1995) on Monterrey
show that the distribution of power determined whether
investments were made or not, who paid for them, and what
 
7
 
In practice, these situations are largely limited to the western USA and
the assumption that they are widely distributed can be very misleading (see
below).
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sources of water were to be tapped. Some cities attract
foreign subsidies (e.g., EU funds for Athens) or benefit
from geopolitical considerations (e.g., Amman) or broad
reconstruction efforts (e.g., Phnom Penh). If society is
receptive to privatization, the financial burden can be shifted
to users, as in the UK. Actual governance, the existence of
environmentalist NGOs and other civil society entities, the
influence of international institutions, the historical background
of political struggles, all shape the viability of particular
solutions and the final distribution of costs and benefits.
In general, notwithstanding the fact that water projects
may be costly or not, the state of the WS&S systems
depends far more on political and financial circumstances
than on competition with other sectors for the basic water
resource (though of course the lack of available resources
close to megalopolises and the difficulty of keeping up with
booming populations may make solutions harder to find, or
more costly).
 
4. Inter-sectoral transfers in practice
 
4.1. Types of transfer mechanisms
 
Inter-sectoral water transfers do happen in practice and take
several forms. 
 
Temporary transfers
 
 typically occur during
a drought. 
 
Permanent transfers
 
 occur when a source of
water already tapped by several users is diverted to the
benefit of a city. Such transfers can be gradual, often first
amounting to a limited percentage of the source of origin,
and their effects tend to be diffuse and unidentifiable if the
source continues to provide a large share of water to other
users. But they can also be 
 
outright, 
 
and if they amount to
a large part or all of an existing source (e.g., the conversion
of irrigation reservoirs to municipal use, as is reported to
have occurred in Tsingtao) then they are likely to be
problematic if no compensation is paid.
Transfers can also be categorized based on the mechanisms
utilized in their implementation, with three apparent main
types.
 
8
 
 A first type of transfer occurs through the transfer
of 
 
formal rights
 
 to the use of water (or sometimes through
the transfer of the land to which they are attached). These
are typified by practices in developed countries, notably the
west US and other arid regions, but increasingly also in the
eastern US and in other developed countries (for instance
in the UK, where traditional riparian rights were modified
in 1969 by the introduction of abstraction permits). Formal
rights can in principle be transferred in a free market with
the price reflecting market conditions either in real time, or
over a longer period (a season or year), or permanently.
Free markets, however, often fail to account for externalities
or third party effects and sales of formal rights are
generally only permitted in a regulated market, with the
terms of the sale set, monitored and enforced by a public
agency, as in the example of the California drought bank.
Alternatively, legislation sets out the terms on which
transfers are to be made, for instance by establishing clear
priorities at times of drought, or limiting the term of the
right so that it can be transferred to a higher value use once
the term has expired (as in the UK). Markets in 
 
informal
rights, 
 
in contrast, develop spontaneously but generally
involve farmer-to-farmer sales rather than inter-sectoral
sales. An exception is the conversion of irrigation wells to
tanker operations in Amman and some cities in India, which
represents a significant case of an unregulated market
transaction from agricultural to urban use.
A second type of transfer, 
 
administrative decision
 
, has
been by far the principal means of transferring water from
one use to another, both historically in developed countries
and to this day in developing countries. 
 
Formal administrative
decisions 
 
are taken by a national, provincial/state or basin
entity depending on the functions assigned to each under
the constitution or in law. Formal administrative decisions
with compensation typically occur where the farmers giving
up supplies are readily identifiable and can bring political
pressure to bear on the decision makers. They involve
varying degrees of consultation between the interested
parties (Seville, Tsingtao, etc.). Direct expropriation is
problematic for any government, even an authoritarian one,
especially in contexts where the local economy revolves
around irrigated agriculture. This is true even if no formal
rights are held. In the few cases in which formal rights exist
and are effective, expropriation is precluded. The buying
out of agricultural wells around some cities (Chennai) is
an example of outright and total reallocation of minor
sources with appropriate compensation.
Negotiations can include financial compensation and/or
efforts by the city to reduce its losses or its consumption.
El Paso, for example, obtained water from the Rio Grande
on condition that it reduce per capita consumption, recycle
sewage water and eliminate leakage (Earl, 1996). Dongyang,
Zheijang Province, obtained water from a dam managed by
the Yiwu city but had to increase the height of the dam and
line irrigation canals (Liu, 2003). Well known agreements
between the Imperial Valley Irrigation district and the
Southern California Metropolitan Water Authority (CGER,
1992), or between Delhi and the Upper Ganga irrigation
scheme included lining of irrigation canals paid by the cities.
When formal administrative decisions to transfer water
are taken unilaterally, they merge imperceptibly into the
final type — informal 
 
transfers by stealth
 
. This may occur
as a result of investment decisions (as in the case of transfers
from reservoirs to cities such as Hyderabad, Amman, Karachi
or Bandung) or management decisions (as in the case of
the Angat reservoir near Manila), or development decisions
(as in the occupation of tanks in Bangalore or the conversion
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The potential of water pricing as a means for eliciting reallocation from
agriculture to other sectors has also been emphasized by some economists
but is now widely considered as negligible (Savenije and van der Zaag,
2002; Cornish and Perry, 2003; Hellegers and Perry, 2004; Molle and
Berkoff, 2007), a point recently acknowledged by the World Bank (2003).
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of irrigated land to urban use as in many expanding cities).
Transfers by stealth by definition do not allow for compensation.
Some such transfers are explicit and obvious to observers,
not least to the farmers; others are more surreptitious.
Diversions through canals or large pumping stations are
overt, especially when they correspond to a large share of
the source of origin. On the other hand, there may be a long
distance between the point of diversion and the downstream
farmers/users. Groundwater abstraction by a city, or
reappropriation of water through gradual encroachment
upon irrigated land (e.g., Manila, Lima, Bangkok, Cairo)
can pass virtually unnoticed at first
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 but the impact on other
groundwater users tends to become manifest with time.
A special case is when transfers concern a source of
water that still has some “excess flow”. Residents in the
basin are then in a weaker position to oppose a transfer,
especially if it can be presented as crucial for economic
development or to ensure “equity” between regions. The
benefits foregone — not least in environmental uses — are
invariably glossed over even if they are already apparent
(as in the Piracicaba diversion to São Paulo), likely to
surface in the mid-term (as in the diversion of the Mae
Klong to Bangkok or of the Kurhang to Isfahan), or may
materialize in the long run (as in the Melamchi basin,
where water is diverted to Katmandu).
In support of transfers out of agriculture it is sometimes
argued that farmers, who typically paid only a small
fraction (if any) of the costs of irrigation, cannot object if
the state subsequently withdraws a part of the water
allocated to them. This has less force once the value of
water is capitalized in land prices. Another argument is that
the real costs to farmers of partial “expropriation” may be
lower than appears at first sight, given the room for
adjustment in many irrigation systems and the fact that the
 
“hidden hand of scarcity”
 
 elicits changes in behaviour and
factor use (Berkoff, 2003).
Predictably, cities do not publicize their water projects,
minimize their impacts, and avoid talk of compensation.
Analyses of conflicts (see above) show that non-
agricultural uses almost always get priority but also that the
crux of the matter is not so much the average amount
diverted to cities but 
 
what this share becomes at times of
shortage
 
. When a drought occurs and the impact felt
becomes critical, it is always possible to naturalize crises,
blaming it on climatic change, El Niño, “the rain gods”
(
 
The Hindu
 
, 2003), or bad luck. Controversial transfers
from the Veeranam tank to Chennai, from the Kinjhar lake
to Karachi, or from El Cuchillo dam to Monterrey, all
officially claim to use “only excess water” and to “preserve
existing uses”, despite evidence to the contrary.
 
4.2. Environmental impacts of transfers
 
In many cases, reallocation to cities occurs by taking more
water from the environment, directly “displacing nature”.
When this option is limited, or exhausted, cities gradually
displace agriculture, which has to adjust and respond to the
squeeze. Part of the response comes through an increase in
efficiency, notably at the basin level where a greater part
of return flows is reused and depleted, or through the use
of wastewater instead of freshwater.
The transfer of water to cities generally results in more
wastewater being generated, and subsequently an increased
emission of pollutants and contaminants. Cities dispose of
80% of the water they divert as wastewater. Only 10% of
the effluents from cities in developing countries are treated
(UNEP, 2003). The growth of urban/industrial needs plays
out not only in terms of transfer of equivalent volumes of
water but also in terms of reduction of the stock of usable
water by rendering part of it unfit for human, and even
agricultural, use. A good example of this is provided by
Janakarajan (2003) who describes the impact of tanneries
on the Palar river basin, in Tamil Nadu.
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 Tanneries use
many toxic chemicals and generate heavy pollution to the
point that downstream farmers have refused to use the river.
This has also happened in the Damodar river (India) due
to coalmines and other industries (Hardoy 
 
et al.
 
, 2001), in
South Africa because of mines, and in the Huai river basin
(China) because of paper industries and tanneries
(Postel, 1999).
It must be noted, however, that agricultural activities are
now increasingly contributing their own pollution load and
contribute to making surface water and groundwater
unusable for cities. Seville, for example, cannot use water
from the Guadalquivir that flows by because of pesticide
and fertilizer residues (Del Moral Ituarte and Giansante,
2000). The cost of agricultural pollution in the US is
estimated at $9 billion per year (Bate, 2002).
As noted earlier, one common way to meet growing
urban needs, or to respond to displacement by cities in
the case of agriculture, has been to exploit/overexploit
groundwater resources. Tapping groundwater is the easiest
solution because it generally relies on individual or corporate
investments (as opposed to public ones), it is spatially
spread with little need for major infrastructure, and it
penalizes constituencies that often have little voice (nature
and subsequent generations). Between 1.5 and 2 billion
 
9
 
Although the undefined or open-access nature of groundwater has
provided cities with other opportunities for ambiguity, tapping groundwater
has sometimes generated a backlash: farmers have clashed with the police
after wells were dug in areas adjacent to their lands to supply Jaipur
(Londhe 
 
et al.
 
, 2004). Similar examples are provided by Ta’iz, where most
agricultural wells ran dry and led to civil unrest, and by Athens, where
its use of a well-field in the Yliki lake area allegedly lowered the water
table, provoking complaints from nearby small-scale farmers (Kallis, 2004).
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In the Palar basin these industries contribute to about Rs 50 billion
(US$1,052 million) by way of foreign exchange annually, besides
employing 100,000 people directly and indirectly (Janakarajan, 2003). A
similar story unfolded in Tirupur, where the hosiery industry generated
Rs30 billion in 1999, with more than half of the population depending on
this industry for their living (Narain, 1999).
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humans in the world, of which one billion urban dwellers
in Asia (Foster, 1999), almost 99% of the US rural
population, and 80% of India’s population (Sampat, 2000),
are reported to rely on groundwater for domestic consumption.
That gives an idea of how widely this solution has been
resorted to. The hidden costs are becoming increasingly
apparent and include:
• A reduction in available stocks, falling water levels and
increasing pumping and related expenditures. Other
aquifers are pumped out (e.g., China: Kendy 
 
et al.
 
, 2003).
• Land subsidence in cities like Mexico City, Manila,
Jakarta, Cangzhou, Beijing, or Bangkok (a third of the
city is now under sea level). Subsidence affects not only
buildings and roads but also the future water storing
capacity of the aquifer itself.
• The quality of groundwater almost everywhere. Realiza-
tion of its extent is increasing in proportion to the
number of measures and investigations being carried out
(Sampat, 2000).
• Salinity intrusion due to the overdraft of coastal aquifers
rendering water unfit for both domestic and agricultural
use, in cities such as Tel Aviv (Swyngedouw 
 
et al.
 
, 2002),
Lima (Masson, 2002), Manila (Fellizar, 1994), Jakarta
and Dakar.
• The drying up of springs and wetlands fed by groundwater
flows that are affected by the lowering of watertables
(e.g., in Jordan, the overdraft of the aquifer to supply
Amman and irrigated crops has dried up the Azraq
wetland, a Ramsar site used by migratory birds).
The overall picture is that if cities have generally found
ways of increasing their water supply, this has often been
in an unsustainable and damaging way, displacing agriculture
and nature, and critically impacting on water quality and
the amount of usable water.
 
4.3. Reallocation stress: political and social costs
 
In a situation of competition, cities will generally have to
re-appropriate water already used, allocated or “owned”
(when a formal right exists) by other users, generally
agriculturalists or nature itself, and this inevitably generates
stress. Such transfers breed political tension irrespective of
the mechanism used — whether unilateral bureaucratic
decision, coercion, compensation or market transactions.
Political stress is generated in proportion to the political
clout of the constituencies that stand to lose in the transfer
(the water users in the first place but also surrounding
communities). Urban industrialists generally command
considerable influence over politicians. Conversely the cost
of doing nothing, or little, is less when urban populations
affected by prevailing poor conditions of WS&S are also
voiceless. As the Camdessus Report put it: “with the mass
of people not serviced politically weak or disempowered,
it is tempting to postpone spending on maintenance and
periodic replacements, likewise on investments with a long
gestation period.”
The difficulty of acquiring more water is also dependent
on the political structure and administrative boundaries.
A transfer within the same state, region or district —
whatever the local structure — is easier to handle than one
that involves different provinces/states in a federal system.
The latter is typically more difficult and depends on the
respective powers vested in the central government and the
states, and on the clarity of their roles (see Barajas (1999)
on Mexico and Richards and Singh (2002) on India).
It is tempting to circumvent political intricacies by choosing
between inter-sectoral transfers, supply augmentation,
 
11
 
 and
other options based on a full cost assessment. In practice,
however, decision-making incorporates wider aspects of
the local political economy, including: social, transactional,
political, and sometimes environmental costs attached to
the various demand — or supply — oriented options; the
nature of the possible source of funding; the degree of
mobilization/pressure by various constituencies; and/or
pre-existing customary (or other) rights and water uses
(Howe, 1987; Howe 
 
et al.
 
, 1990). Eventually, decision
makers tend to follow the 
 
“path of least resistance”
 
(Kenney, 2004), which may well differ from what economic
rationality might, 
 
prima facie
 
, suggest. Pursuing a mere
economic logic is moreover likely to be detrimental to
equity, though unchecked centralized and obscure decision
making in turn may favour costly options that only benefit
a few constituencies. Political mediation has to follow a
narrow path between public and private interests (Schwartz
and Schouten, 2007).
 
5. Revisiting the allocation gap: Conclusions and 
perspectives
 
5.1. The allocation gap revisited
 
Industrial and domestic water use is often believed to be
constrained by the excess water used in agriculture. Since
agriculture is usually inefficient both in technical (it incurs
many losses) and economic terms (the value of produce per
cubic meter is low), this situation is said to create an
“allocation gap” that amounts to an economic loss to
society. This paper has challenged the magnitude of this
gap and given alternative analyses of the nature of urban
water scarcity, distinguishing between municipal and
industrial uses, and between short-term and long-term
reallocation.
Temporary reallocation often occurs in times of drought.
Short-term crises may be partly due to climatic variability
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Bhatia and Falkenmark (1993) and Serageldin (1995) estimate that the
financial and environmental costs of tapping new supplies will be, on
average, two or three times those of existing investments, because most
of the low-cost, accessible water reserves have already been exploited.
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but they are compounded by lax management of reserves
in storage and pervasive lack of preparedness. Except for
situations where irrigation holds a ‘senior’ water right or
where allocations are not reduced in time (crops have
already been planted), agriculture typically must relinquish
its share first, with shortages only secondarily (and partially)
affecting domestic use, and ultimately industrial use (if
industries do not use groundwater).
Over the long run, cities also appear little constrained by
competition from agriculture. While suboptimal WS&S
conditions in many cities, particularly in arid climates,
point to a lack of water, this situation is mainly due to
insufficient investments that have economic and political
roots, and eventually reflect incentives to decision-makers
for prioritizing such investments. Industries, in turn, either
rely on groundwater or receive priority allocation justified
by their economic importance, and contribution to the local
tax base and employment.
Thus, contrary to much received wisdom on state failure,
governments give priority to cities and industries because
of their economic significance and elite interests.
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 Transfers
 
do 
 
occur and the alleged economic benefits waiting to be
realized are often much inflated. In other words, the
opportunity costs of irrigation water though positive at the
margin are often only weakly so and, once urban demands
are satisfied, these opportunity costs fall to zero. Thus, in
both the short and long-term, as many analysts have
observed, farmers are “losing out” (Winpenny, 1994),
urban interests are getting the “upper hand” (Lundqvist,
1993), and “without a doubt, cities will continue to siphon
water away from agriculture” (Postel, 1999).
Even so, it is widely believed that increased supply to
cities could enhance economic output, and that physical
scarcity is mainly due to available water being locked up
in agriculture. In the Asian Development Banks’s (ADB,
2000) view, for example, “Irrigation is particularly voracious,
accounting for up to 80% of water demand in hot dry
regions ... Major obstacles to the rational reallocation of
water among users ... are the legal and regulatory constraints
on water transfers and, in many countries, the complex
systems of water rights that inhibit the free movement of
water as an economic good.” Why does the literature appear
to place such emphasis on the gains from reallocation, if
these are in fact quite limited? Perhaps the answer lies in
part with an over-hasty generalization of the situation in
the Western US (where the prior-appropriation doctrine has
sometimes constrained the transfer of water out of low-
value uses
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) to contexts where centralized management
has by and large ensured inter-sectoral reallocation. It may
also reflect the ideological inclination of those advocating
markets as an allocation mechanism (Bauer, 2004).
The paper has therefore reframed the question of the
allocation gap within an inquiry of how transfers in practice
occur. While cities by and large succeed in accessing the
supplies that they need, this has often been sub-optimal in
economic, social or environmental terms. Water has often
been over-abstracted from aquifers, taken from ecosystems
or from agriculture (which, in turn, has often displaced
nature too), or diverted from distant sources at a high cost.
Economic rationality has often been ignored with decision
making reflecting wider social and political considerations
that are not easily captured by valuation techniques. All
things considered, as mentioned earlier, cities generally
select the path of least resistance. “Politics” is often
construed in a negative sense due to its rent-seeking and
pork-barrel dimensions, but these aspects must be set
against the democratization of decision making and increased
public access to data. Political mediation, in practice, can
also be an effective way of balancing antagonistic interests
and world views, rather than simply being a way to further
vested interests (Schwartz and Schouten, 2007).
Finally, the frequent statement that reallocating a minor
fraction of irrigation water to cities would suffice to cater
to the needs of people with poor water supply conditions
is in many instances deceptive: both the arithmetic and the
causality are erroneous. Much of the water used by
irrigation is diverted at times and places where there is no
alternative use and a large part of return flows — in water
short basins — is reused downstream. Our contention is
that the causal association between, on the one hand, the
insufficient and precarious conditions of access to water in
“thirsty cities,” highlighted in times of crises, and, on the
other, water scarcity allegedly caused by a wasteful
irrigation sector, is largely misleading.
Somewhat ironically, it seems that reallocation is truly
problematic only where water rights are formally defined
and enforced and thus liable to formal transactions. In all
cases, however, the crux remains to rationalize and compensate
for transfers
 
14
 
 while the difficulty of accounting for
third-party and environmental impacts remains a challenge
endlessly renewed by climate variability and shifting
patterns of power.
 
5.2. How to improve reallocation of water
The option of water markets.
 
Small-scale water markets have long existed in many arid
countries. Users sharing a common source (spring, qanat,
etc) occasionally swap, lend, borrow, sell or buy water turns
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China has publicly announced that agriculture would be the residual
claimant, while in the middle-East/Northern Africa region “the growth
and the demand for water in cities and by industry is satisfied by taking
water from agriculture. This is offset by importing grain” (Brown, 2000).
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When presenting these conclusions at a congress on irrigation and
drainage in Sacramento, US, one of the authors was told by several attendees
that for all the debate on prior appropriation rights, transfers to cities also
did happen in the western US without substantially constraining urban sprawl.
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Although market mechanisms are thought to offer an adequate
compensation mechanism to the seller, systemic or induced regional
impacts are harder to compensate for (Howe 
 
et al.
 
, 1990; Rosegrant and
Ringler, 1998).
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in order to fine-tune supply to time-specific individual
demands. This also occurs in large-scale irrigation systems
(e.g., warabandi in Pakistan and Northwest India). At this
scale, transaction costs are minimized because users know
each other (Reidinger, 1994), can readily communicate,
and transfers are across short distances without costly
infrastructures or significant losses. Permanent transfer of
ownership is also socially controlled and local third-party
impacts are more easily identified and taken into account.
The extension of market mechanisms on a larger scale has
been much less frequent and more difficult (Livingston,
1995). Markets in the western US are limited by constraints
that reflect the crucial nature of water for life and the
complexity of the hydrological cycle, which invariably
generates third-party impacts (Dellapenna, 2000; Kenney,
2003; Libecap, 2003). In the Colorado-Big-Thompson
system, market transactions have allowed smooth and
gradual transfer partly because trading is occurring only
within the system and because the water district holds the
right to all return-flows (Howe and Goemans, 2003;
Libecap, 2003). Water markets in Australia (Isaac, 2002;
Turral 
 
et al.
 
, 2004) and in Chile (Alicera 
 
et al.
 
, 1999;
Bauer, 2004) remain limited in terms of volume traded but
reallocation has performed reasonably well, although third
party impacts and speculative behaviour reduce their efficiency.
China also started experimenting with inter-provincial trading
of water but soon discovered the implications in terms of
return-flows and environmental impacts (Fu and Hu, 2002).
Positive experience with markets seems to be confined
to countries with a strong legal, institutional and regulatory
background and relatively wealthy stakeholders. Proposals
for their adoption in countries where hydrological data are
scarce, physical infrastructure is lacking, and states have
weak monitoring and enforcement capacity, are unrealistic.
One may question why states that have allegedly failed to
allocate water efficiently would be capable of creating the
preconditions and safeguards needed to ensure fair and
transparent markets (Molle, 2004a). While mechanisms
that facilitate flexibility in allocation have always developed
at a scale where social control and hydraulic infrastructure
made them possible, it is doubtful that fully-fledged markets
will constitute a major tool for the reallocation of water in
the near future, most especially in developing countries
(Frederik, 1998; Dellapenna, 2000; Livingston, 1995;
Meinzen-Dick and Appasamy, 2002).
 
Contingency planning and temporary transfers.
 
Conflicts
between cities and agriculture surface primarily during
water crises, when the share diverted by the former rises
from a low average to a much larger share. This implies
that permanent transfers of rights are often not necessary
(Savenije and van der Zaag, 2002). Agricultural and non-
agricultural uses can usually coexist, if shares are
expressed in terms of average. Emphasis should be placed
on the design and provision of mechanisms to compensate
farmers for losses and deprivation that 
 
will 
 
occur in times
of shortage. This is easier to achieve than permanent
expropriation of agricultural water, while allowing for a
more efficient use of water.
State or cities which tap other sources prefer to present
(and obscure) the impact of diversions in average terms.
Technical agencies, too, are reluctant to engage in debates
that would reveal that domestic supply is not fully reliable
and undermine their professional legitimacy. There is thus
little incentive to develop explicit contingency plans for dry
years, which would shed a different light on the future
impact of diversions. Yet, drought-management strategies
are needed to provide an early warning of possible shortages
and as a predefined set of actions for different conditions
(Frederiksen, 1992; Michelsen and Young, 1993). If
priorities are well-established and transparent information
provided, negotiations can prepare for such arrangements
and avoid the outcry and political crises that often accompany
severe water shortages. Although market-based options are
possible in certain settings (see above), 
 
ad hoc
 
 negotiating
processes mediated by state institutions seem to prevail.
Compensations can be discussed and negotiated irrespective
of the degree of formalization of rights and of the type of
government. Examples include Chinese municipalities or
provinces, cities like Seville, the “drought bank” set up in
1991 in California (Teerink and Nakashima, 1993), and the
compensatory measures planned in Japan (Kobayashi, 2006).
 
Participation and environmental justice.
 
The displacement
of agriculture and nature by growing cities/industries as
well as their indirect impact through their contamination of
freshwater have heavy social, environmental, and health
costs. The magnitude and the distribution of these
externalities are very much a reflection of the governance
structure of the society. The “stamina” and mobilization of
the “people living downstream” (Narain, 1999), and the
political space offered to disenfranchised groups to voice
their concerns are paramount (Anderson, 1995). They
ultimately determine not only whether externalities are
recognized and internalized, but also who pays.
Because WS&S projects usually involve large outlays of
money, decision-making remains largely centralized and
technology-oriented. A more equitable distribution of benefits
and costs is possible when a more inclusive and informed
process of decision making on infrastructure development
or water reallocation options is observed. A shift from supply-
oriented paternalistic development to process-oriented
approaches leading to “informed consent” (Delli Priscoli, 2004)
is materializing only slowly. Deliberative development enables
a better definition of social choice but can only develop in
a political configuration where redistribution of power is possible.
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